Decoy · Device

Elasticsearch decoy

Search clusters often hold copies of customer data and logs, and exposed ones are a common source of leaks. This decoy poses as es-data-01, an Elasticsearch node with its HTTP API and cluster port.

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What it emulates

Poses as: Elasticsearch cluster.

It records every request to the API, such as listing indices or searching, and every username and password sent.

SSH 22
Records every username, password and key fingerprint tried, then refuses them. Disconnects after six tries.
Elasticsearch 9200
The Elasticsearch HTTP API. Records every request, such as cluster health, index listing and searches, and every username and password sent. Answers with a sign-in requirement.
ES transport 9300
Accepts the connection and records the first bytes sent. It does not speak the protocol yet.

What it catches

Every touch, explained in plain English.

Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.

Index listing and search requests, a sign of data theft
Username and password guessing on the API
Known exploit payloads sent to the API
Port scans across the cluster

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.

T1046Network Service Discovery
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1110Brute Force
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC

Safe by design

Built to be attacked. Never a way in.

A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.

It runs nothing
The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.
It connects to one place only
Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.
Kandaro can only send it settings
Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.
It holds no real secrets
Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.
It cannot be used to attack others
It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.

Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors

Where to put it

Place it where an intruder will look.

Put it in the data or logging network, next to your real search and log clusters.

Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys

FAQ