Decoy · Device
MongoDB decoy
Exposed MongoDB servers are a classic source of data leaks. This decoy poses as mongo-primary01, running MongoDB 7.0, with SSH.
What it emulates
Poses as: MongoDB database server.
Queries return generated documents with a cursor that never runs out, so a data thief stays busy while every query is recorded.
- SSH 22
Records every username, password and key fingerprint tried, then refuses them. Disconnects after six tries.
- MongoDB 27017
Speaks MongoDB 7.0. Records sign-in attempts and every query. Queries return generated documents with a cursor that never runs out: fake data, served slowly.
What it catches
Every touch, explained in plain English.
Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.
- Sign-in attempts
- Queries that pull documents, a sign of data theft
- SSH password guessing
- Port scans across the server
MITRE ATT&CK
Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.
- T1046Network Service Discovery
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1110Brute Force
Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC
Safe by design
Built to be attacked. Never a way in.
A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.
It runs nothing
The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.
It connects to one place only
Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.
Kandaro can only send it settings
Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.
It holds no real secrets
Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.
It cannot be used to attack others
It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.
Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors
Where to put it
Place it where an intruder will look.
Put it in the database or application network, next to your real databases.
Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys
FAQ
MongoDB decoy questions
Is the data real?
Is it safe to run on my network?
Related decoys
Pair it with these.
- device
Linux server
Ubuntu database and web server
The classic lateral-movement target: SSH, a web admin, MySQL, Redis and MongoDB.
SSH 22HTTP 80HTTPS 443MySQL 3306Redis 6379+3 - device
Elasticsearch
Elasticsearch cluster
A search cluster that looks full of data. Catches index listing and credential guessing.
SSH 22Elasticsearch 9200ES transport 9300 - device
PostgreSQL
PostgreSQL database server
A database server on its usual port, plus SSH. Catches scans and password guessing.
SSH 22PostgreSQL 5432
Put this decoy on your network today.
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