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Decoy · Application

Jenkins CI decoy

A build server holds the credentials to deploy everywhere, and its script console runs any code. This decoy poses as a Jenkins 2.440 server with its login page and API.

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What it emulates

Poses as: Jenkins build server.

It records every login and every attempt to list jobs, open the script console, read stored credentials, start a build or change plugins.

  • SSH 22

    Records every password, key and username tried, then refuses them. Only a password Kandaro planted opens a fake shell, where every command is recorded and answered with made-up output. Nothing runs.

  • Jenkins 8080

    The Jenkins login page and API. Records every login and every attempt to list jobs, use the script console, read credentials, start a build or manage plugins. All are refused.

What it catches

Every touch, explained in plain English.

Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.

  • Logins to Jenkins
  • Attempts to use the Groovy script console, which would run code
  • Attempts to read stored credentials
  • Attempts to start builds or change plugins, a supply-chain risk
  • Commands typed into the fake shell

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.

  • T1046Network Service Discovery
  • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • T1110Brute Force
  • T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC

Safe by design

Built to be attacked. Never a way in.

A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.

  • It runs nothing

    The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.

  • It connects to one place only

    Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.

  • Kandaro can only send it settings

    Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.

  • It holds no real secrets

    Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.

  • It cannot be used to attack others

    It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.

Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors

Where to put it

Place it where an intruder will look.

Put it in your build or CI network, next to your real build servers.

Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys

FAQ

Jenkins CI decoy questions

Can an attacker run a script on it?
No. The script console is recorded and refused. The sensor has no way to run anything.
Is it safe to run on my network?
Yes. A decoy only answers connections with fake data. It runs nothing, forwards nothing and only connects out to the Kandaro API over HTTPS. It runs as an unprivileged, read-only container.

Related decoys

Pair it with these.

Put this decoy on your network today.

Start a 14-day trial of Kandaro Deception. Your first decoy is running in about a minute.

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