Decoy · Application
GitLab decoy
Source code and the CI/CD variables beside it are high-value targets. This decoy poses as a GitLab server with its sign-in page and API.
What it emulates
Poses as: GitLab server.
It records every sign-in and every attempt to list projects or users, read CI/CD variables, reach the container registry or open the admin area.
- SSH 22
Records every username, password and key fingerprint tried, then refuses them. Disconnects after six tries.
- GitLab 80
The GitLab sign-in page and API. Records every sign-in and every attempt to list projects or users, read CI/CD variables, reach the registry or open the admin area.
What it catches
Every touch, explained in plain English.
Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.
- Sign-in attempts
- Project and user listing
- Attempts to read CI/CD variables, which often hold secrets
- Admin area access
- SSH password guessing
MITRE ATT&CK
Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.
- T1046Network Service Discovery
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1110Brute Force
- T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC
Safe by design
Built to be attacked. Never a way in.
A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.
It runs nothing
The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.
It connects to one place only
Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.
Kandaro can only send it settings
Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.
It holds no real secrets
Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.
It cannot be used to attack others
It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.
Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors
Where to put it
Place it where an intruder will look.
Put it in your development or CI network, next to your real code servers.
Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys
FAQ
GitLab decoy questions
Does it hold any code?
Is it safe to run on my network?
Related decoys
Pair it with these.
- app
Jenkins CI
Jenkins build server
A build server with credentials for every deploy target. Catches script console and credential access.
SSH 22Jenkins 8080 - app
Argo CD
Argo CD GitOps server
A GitOps server with credentials for your clusters and Git repos.
SSH 22Argo CD 8080 - app
Keycloak IAM
Keycloak identity server
A fake single sign-on server. Whoever controls it controls every account.
SSH 22Keycloak 8080
Put this decoy on your network today.
Start a 14-day trial of Kandaro Deception. Your first decoy is running in about a minute.
Card required · cancel before day 14 and pay nothing