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Decoy · Application

Keycloak IAM decoy

Whoever controls the identity provider controls every user account, so attackers look for it early. This decoy poses as auth-prod01, a Keycloak server with its realm, OIDC endpoints, login page and admin console.

What it emulates

Poses as: Keycloak identity server.

Any call to the admin API, such as listing users or creating one, is something no legitimate user would do against a server they never heard of.

  • SSH 22

    Records every password, key and username tried, then refuses them. Only a password Kandaro planted opens a fake shell, where every command is recorded and answered with made-up output. Nothing runs.

  • Keycloak 8080

    A Keycloak realm with OIDC discovery and a login page. Records every login and token request, and every call to the admin API, such as listing or creating users and realms.

What it catches

Every touch, explained in plain English.

Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.

  • Password spraying against the login and token endpoints
  • Stolen tokens being checked
  • Attempts to list users, create users or create realms through the admin API
  • Commands typed into the fake shell

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.

  • T1046Network Service Discovery
  • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • T1110Brute Force
  • T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC

Safe by design

Built to be attacked. Never a way in.

A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.

  • It runs nothing

    The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.

  • It connects to one place only

    Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.

  • Kandaro can only send it settings

    Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.

  • It holds no real secrets

    Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.

  • It cannot be used to attack others

    It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.

Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors

Where to put it

Place it where an intruder will look.

Put it next to your real identity servers, or in the server VLAN under a name like auth or sso.

Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys · Why your Keycloak or Okta server is worth decoy-ing

FAQ

Keycloak IAM decoy questions

Why decoy an identity provider?
Taking over an identity provider gives an attacker every account at once. A fake one catches them the moment they try.
Can an attacker actually log in?
No. Every real username and password is refused. Only a password Kandaro planted as bait opens a fake shell, and even there nothing runs: every command gets made-up output.
Is it safe to run on my network?
Yes. A decoy only answers connections with fake data. It runs nothing, forwards nothing and only connects out to the Kandaro API over HTTPS. It runs as an unprivileged, read-only container.

Put this decoy on your network today.

Start a 14-day trial of Kandaro Deception. Your first decoy is running in about a minute.

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