Decoy · Application
Keycloak IAM decoy
Whoever controls the identity provider controls every user account, so attackers look for it early. This decoy poses as auth-prod01, a Keycloak server with its realm, OIDC endpoints, login page and admin console.
What it emulates
Poses as: Keycloak identity server.
Any call to the admin API, such as listing users or creating one, is something no legitimate user would do against a server they never heard of.
- SSH 22
Records every password, key and username tried, then refuses them. Only a password Kandaro planted opens a fake shell, where every command is recorded and answered with made-up output. Nothing runs.
- Keycloak 8080
A Keycloak realm with OIDC discovery and a login page. Records every login and token request, and every call to the admin API, such as listing or creating users and realms.
What it catches
Every touch, explained in plain English.
Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.
- Password spraying against the login and token endpoints
- Stolen tokens being checked
- Attempts to list users, create users or create realms through the admin API
- Commands typed into the fake shell
MITRE ATT&CK
Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.
- T1046Network Service Discovery
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1110Brute Force
- T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC
Safe by design
Built to be attacked. Never a way in.
A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.
It runs nothing
The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.
It connects to one place only
Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.
Kandaro can only send it settings
Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.
It holds no real secrets
Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.
It cannot be used to attack others
It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.
Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors
Where to put it
Place it where an intruder will look.
Put it next to your real identity servers, or in the server VLAN under a name like auth or sso.
Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys · Why your Keycloak or Okta server is worth decoy-ing
FAQ
Keycloak IAM decoy questions
Why decoy an identity provider?
Can an attacker actually log in?
Is it safe to run on my network?
Related decoys
Pair it with these.
- app
HashiCorp Vault
HashiCorp Vault secrets manager
A fake secrets manager. Every attempt to read a secret is an alert.
SSH 22Vault 8200 - device
Active Directory DC
Active Directory domain controller
The ports of a domain controller. Catches scans and connections to LDAP, Kerberos and SMB.
LDAP 389LDAPS 636Kerberos 88/udpSMB 445RPC 135+1 - app
GitLab
GitLab server
A source-code server with CI secrets. Catches logins, project listing and CI variable access.
SSH 22GitLab 80
Put this decoy on your network today.
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