Decoy · Application

n8n automation decoy

Workflow tools like n8n store API keys for every service they automate. This decoy poses as n8n-prod, running n8n 1.113 with its Postgres database.

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What it emulates

Poses as: n8n workflow automation.

It records sign-ins, API keys, attempts to take over the owner account and calls to its webhooks.

SSH 22
Records every password, key and username tried, then refuses them. Only a password Kandaro planted opens a fake shell, where every command is recorded and answered with made-up output. Nothing runs.
n8n 5678
The n8n sign-in page. Records every login, every API key sent to its public API, attempts to set up a new owner account and calls to webhook and form URLs.
PostgreSQL 5432
Speaks PostgreSQL. Records the username and database, asks for the password in plain text, records it and refuses.

What it catches

Every touch, explained in plain English.

Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.

Logins to n8n and its database
Stolen n8n API keys
Attempts to take over the owner account
Calls to webhook and form URLs
Commands typed into the fake shell

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.

T1046Network Service Discovery
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1110Brute Force
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC

Safe by design

Built to be attacked. Never a way in.

A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.

It runs nothing
The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.
It connects to one place only
Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.
Kandaro can only send it settings
Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.
It holds no real secrets
Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.
It cannot be used to attack others
It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.

Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors

Where to put it

Place it where an intruder will look.

Put it in the application network, near your real automation and integration servers.

Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys

FAQ