Decoy · Device
PostgreSQL decoy
Databases are what most intruders are after in the end. This decoy poses as pg-primary01, a PostgreSQL server with SSH.
What it emulates
Poses as: PostgreSQL database server.
Its database port accepts connections and records what each client sends. For full PostgreSQL emulation, which records the password, use the n8n decoy.
- SSH 22
Records every username, password and key fingerprint tried, then refuses them. Disconnects after six tries.
- PostgreSQL 5432
Accepts the connection and records the first bytes sent. It does not speak the protocol yet.
What it catches
Every touch, explained in plain English.
Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.
- Connections to the database port
- SSH password guessing
- Port scans across the server
MITRE ATT&CK
Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.
- T1046Network Service Discovery
- T1110Brute Force
Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC
Safe by design
Built to be attacked. Never a way in.
A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.
It runs nothing
The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.
It connects to one place only
Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.
Kandaro can only send it settings
Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.
It holds no real secrets
Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.
It cannot be used to attack others
It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.
Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors
Where to put it
Place it where an intruder will look.
Put it in the database network, next to your real database servers.
Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys
FAQ
PostgreSQL decoy questions
Does it hold any data?
Is it safe to run on my network?
Related decoys
Pair it with these.
- device
SQL Server
Microsoft SQL Server
A SQL Server on its usual ports, plus SSH. Catches database scans and connection attempts.
SSH 22SQL Server 1433SQL Browser 1434/udp - device
MongoDB
MongoDB database server
A MongoDB server that serves endless fake documents to anyone pulling data.
SSH 22MongoDB 27017 - device
Linux server
Ubuntu database and web server
The classic lateral-movement target: SSH, a web admin, MySQL, Redis and MongoDB.
SSH 22HTTP 80HTTPS 443MySQL 3306Redis 6379+3
Put this decoy on your network today.
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