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Decoy · Device

NAS decoy

Before ransomware operators encrypt anything, they find and delete the backups. This decoy poses as nas-backup, a storage box with a DiskStation-style admin page, file shares, FTP, SSH and VNC.

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What it emulates

Poses as: NAS and backup storage.

Anyone poking at a backup server they were never told about is a strong signal, and catching them here means catching them before the encryption starts.

  • HTTP 5000

    A "NAS Storage Manager" login page that records every username and password.

  • HTTP 80

    The same login page on the standard web port.

  • HTTPS admin 5001

    The same login page over HTTPS, with a certificate unique to this decoy.

  • SSH 22

    Records every password tried. Only a planted password opens a fake BusyBox shell, where every command is recorded and nothing runs.

  • FTP 21

    Records every username and password tried and every command sent. Never lets anyone in.

  • SMB 445

    Answers the Windows file-sharing handshake and records the username, domain and computer name of whoever tries to sign in, then refuses. There are no shares to open.

  • NetBIOS 139

    The older NetBIOS route into the same file-sharing service.

  • VNC 5900

    Speaks the VNC remote-screen protocol. If the password tried is a common one, the alert names it. Never shows a screen.

What it catches

Every touch, explained in plain English.

Each event gets a plain-English explanation. Related events from the same source become one incident with a recommended action.

  • Logins to the storage admin page
  • Windows sign-ins against the backup shares
  • Password guessing on FTP, SSH and VNC
  • Commands typed into the fake shell
  • Port scans across the box

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques come from a fixed table, not from AI, so the same activity always maps the same way.

  • T1046Network Service Discovery
  • T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
  • T1110Brute Force
  • T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API

Incidents go to email, Slack, your SIEM or a signed webhook. Kandaro and your SOC

Safe by design

Built to be attacked. Never a way in.

A decoy only listens and answers with fake data. It never runs code and only connects out to Kandaro, so it can never become a way into your network.

  • It runs nothing

    The sensor has no way to run a command, load code or update itself. Every command an intruder types gets a fake text answer.

  • It connects to one place only

    Its only outbound connection is HTTPS to the Kandaro API address set at install time. Nothing Kandaro sends can change that address.

  • Kandaro can only send it settings

    Which decoy to imitate, which services to turn off, which addresses to ignore. There is no field for code, files, commands or updates.

  • It holds no real secrets

    Passwords, keys and records it shows are fake. Its only credential is its own key, which can send events for your organisation and nothing more.

  • It cannot be used to attack others

    It never forwards traffic, never fetches a URL and never serves scripts or programs. Its only UDP replies (SNMP) are rate-limited per address.

Non-root, read-only container with signed images. How we secure sensors

Where to put it

Place it where an intruder will look.

Put it next to your real backup storage, or in the server VLAN under a name that sounds like backups.

Installs in about a minute with Docker, Kubernetes, Ansible, a VM or a Raspberry Pi, and needs outbound HTTPS only. Deployment guide · Where to put your first decoys · Backup servers: the forgotten attack surface

FAQ

NAS decoy questions

Why a NAS decoy?
Backups are what stop a ransomware attack from becoming a disaster, so attackers go after them first. A fake backup box is one of the first things they will try.
Can an attacker actually log in?
No. Every real username and password is refused. Only a password Kandaro planted as bait opens a fake shell, and even there nothing runs: every command gets made-up output.
Is it safe to run on my network?
Yes. A decoy only answers connections with fake data. It runs nothing, forwards nothing and only connects out to the Kandaro API over HTTPS. It runs as an unprivileged, read-only container.

Related decoys

Pair it with these.

Put this decoy on your network today.

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